Will Iran Yield to Pressure?

Iran is viewed as an adversary of the State of Israel. For that reason, Israel’s authorities take actions aimed at weakening—and even eliminating—the threat it poses. This line of argument has appeared for years in Israeli-American relations. For decades, nearly all Israeli prime ministers have sought to convince successive presidents of the United States that the threat from Iran is serious enough to require decisive action.

Most U.S. administrations—except the current presidency of Donald Trump—have assessed, however, that Iran’s capabilities are not sufficient to pose a real threat to Israel’s existence and that, in the event of an open confrontation, the United States would provide support. As a result, the problem was considered not to require an immediate military solution.

Israel repeatedly appealed to Washington to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, which it regards as the greatest threat to its security. For a long time, these appeals were refused. Only last year did the U.S. president conclude that neutralizing these facilities was in the interest not only of Israel but also of the United States itself—and, more broadly, of the West. During the twelve-day conflict in June of last year, U.S. forces carried out strikes on key sites of Iran’s nuclear program. This allowed President Trump to announce that the nuclear threat from Tehran had been significantly reduced.

At the same time—according to Israeli intelligence assessments—Iran’s nuclear program has only been delayed by a few months and is still continuing. Iran possesses a significant quantity of enriched uranium (estimated at about 400 kilograms) that has not yet reached a level enabling the construction of a nuclear weapon, but could potentially be further enriched. In Israel’s view, this means the threat has not been completely eliminated, only postponed.

Israel portrayed the situation as extremely difficult. Iran has a developed arsenal of ballistic missiles which, during Iranian counterattacks in the so-called twelve-day conflict in June of last year, partially penetrated Israel’s missile defense system, regarded as one of the most effective in the world. Several missiles landed on Israeli territory, causing casualties and damage.

In Israel’s strategic debate, the argument often returns that in the event of the use of nuclear weapons, even one or two warheads could lead to catastrophic consequences for a territorially small state. Iranian leaders have repeatedly used harsh rhetoric toward Israel, further reinforcing a sense of existential threat. From this perspective, any Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would be an unacceptable scenario for Israel.

This type of argumentation—so it is suggested—reached President Donald Trump, who decided to strike targets on Iranian territory. These actions coincided with a tense internal situation in Iran, where in previous years there were mass protests brutally suppressed by the authorities. Speculation emerged as to whether external pressure combined with public dissatisfaction could lead to the weakening or change of the ruling ayatollah regime.

Assessing public sentiment in Iran, however, remains very difficult. The political system is tightly controlled, access to free media is limited, and independent public-opinion research virtually does not exist. It is therefore hard to state unequivocally whether earlier waves of protests had the potential to overthrow the government or whether—faced with an external threat—society is more inclined to consolidate around the state.

Information coming from Washington suggested that the military operation could continue for weeks. At the same time, the U.S. administration emphasized that this was not a classic intervention in the style of operations conducted in Iraq or Afghanistan—aimed at promoting democracy—but rather an effort to achieve a clearly defined victory and compel Iran to make concessions.

In this context, it is worth recalling the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988, when Iran fought a devastating conflict with Iraq ruled by Saddam Hussein. One of the key disputed areas was the oil-rich province of Khuzestan. The war claimed hundreds of thousands—and according to some estimates, even about one million—victims and ended with a ceasefire that largely restored the prewar status quo. Paradoxically, however, it contributed to the consolidation of Iranian society around the authorities.

The question of whether a similar “rally around the flag” mechanism will work now remains open. History shows that prolonged external pressure does not always weaken a regime—sometimes it actually strengthens it. Therefore, assessing the effectiveness of the current strategy toward Iran requires caution and consideration of both military and socio-political factors.

In debates about Iran’s internal situation, the strong role of Shiite ideology is often emphasized; since the Islamic Revolution it has been the foundation of the political system. For some observers, this means deep indoctrination of a significant portion of society. At the same time, younger generations, with access to the internet and contact with the outside world, operate in a completely different information environment. Still, it is difficult to assess unequivocally the real scale of support for the authorities—the system is closed, and reliable public-opinion research virtually does not exist.

The memory of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988 remains key to understanding Iran’s strategic mentality. At that time, Iran was attacked by Iraq ruled by Saddam Hussein, and a significant part of the Arab world as well as many Western countries sided with Baghdad. Iran had limited international support (including from Syria and North Korea), and yet it maintained its territorial integrity. In Iran’s historical narrative, the conflict became a symbol of resistance and self-reliance.

Iran is a multiethnic state. In addition to Persians, a significant part of the population consists of Azerbaijanis (estimated at around one-third of society), as well as Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and other groups. After World War II, with the support of the Soviet Union, the short-lived Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan was established in northwestern Iran. In the past, there were also autonomy movements among Kurds. These ethnic differences are sometimes pointed to as potential fault lines that, under favorable circumstances, could be exploited to weaken the state.

At the same time, a factor binding a significant part of society together remains Shiism as the dominant branch of Islam in Iran. Even among ethnically distinct groups—such as Azerbaijanis in Iran—religious community can be stronger than ethnic ties with neighboring Sunni nations.

In the context of the current conflict, geostrategic threads also appear, such as the possibility of blocking the Strait of Hormuz—a key route for oil transport. In the United States, meanwhile, there is debate over whether air strikes alone are sufficient to achieve political goals, or whether, without internal changes in Iran, they will not bring a decisive outcome.

The administration of President Donald Trump presented its demands as conditions for ending the conflict: handing over stocks of enriched uranium, abandoning further development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and ceasing support for allied armed organizations in the region (including in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or Yemen). More broadly, changes regarding human rights and the functioning of the political system were also demanded. These demands were rejected by Tehran.

History shows that Iran has a strong sense of civilizational continuity reaching back thousands of years. This translates into a high level of sensitivity on issues of sovereignty and an aversion to external pressure. Under such conditions, an attempt to force capitulation solely by military means may lead more to the consolidation of society than to its fragmentation.

Therefore, the task facing Israel and the United States remains extremely complex. It encompasses not only the military dimension but, above all, the political and social one—and these factors, in Iran’s case, have historically proven exceptionally resistant to pressure from outside.