Sex and Espionage: One of the World’s Oldest Intelligence Methods

The use of sexuality in intelligence operations is not a new phenomenon. It is worth emphasizing that the spy profession is among the oldest in history, though of course not the “oldest profession in the world.” Espionage has accompanied humanity since the dawn of time – much like sexuality, which is an integral element of social life. It is therefore natural that these two spheres intersect in various contexts.

Historical examples are numerous. The best-known is Mata Hari, who operated as a German agent. It is also worth recalling Operation “Beautiful Apollo,” conducted by the GDR intelligence service during the Cold War on the territory of the FRG and other Western countries, including at NATO headquarters itself and within Alliance commands. It proved exceptionally effective—handsome men and attractive women sent by the Stasi used intimate relationships as a tool for recruiting people of interest to the GDR intelligence service, and often also to the Soviet one. It is worth adding that this method is not the domain of a single state. Various services use it. The key is to find people predisposed to this type of activity, both psychologically and physically.

The second element is the analysis of the so-called target, meaning the person who can potentially be recruited. Before an operational action takes place, an intelligence service prepares a detailed profile of the candidate covering various aspects of their life, vulnerabilities, and motivations. Only on the basis of such an analysis is a decision made to use a method based on an intimate relationship.

Still Relevant

Recently, a case was revealed involving the activities of Chinese intelligence, which attempted to recruit an American diplomat—who was also a CIA officer—through actions carried out by an attractive Chinese diplomat. The man concerned described the matter publicly, stating that he informed the authorities about the recruitment attempt, which then led to the diplomat being expelled from the country.
From a moral standpoint, such actions may provoke objection and seem immoral or unacceptable. However, intelligence is a special service—and by definition this means undertaking special actions. Operations conducted by intelligence services are most often illegal in the countries on whose territory they are carried out, and people who engage in espionage are subject to detention and criminal liability.
This does not change the fact that intelligence services take care of their officers and agents, seeking to recover them in the event of arrest. Spy exchanges, such as those recently carried out between the United States and Russia, are the best example of this. It is worth recalling the case of Paweł Rubcow, who was extracted from a Polish prison thanks to the intervention of Russian services. This shows the determination and effectiveness of intelligence services in protecting their own people.

In passing, it is worth noting that Rubcow’s activity in Poland and other countries shows that he himself involved women in his intelligence operations. In Poland he had a partner—to this day it is not known what the true nature of their relationship was. It is known, however, that he maintained similar contacts in other places as well, which indicates that he was exceptionally active in this area. Most likely he used these women to achieve operational objectives. It is up to the prosecutors to determine the details, but as to the fact itself there is no doubt.

Top Secret

Intelligence services are interested in classified, secret information. A person who is not a carrier of such information usually is not an object of interest, because they simply have nothing valuable to provide. That is why there is no point in undertaking complex recruitment actions against someone completely useless operationally. At most, such a person may have auxiliary value—for example, to transport something, hide something, or provide a place for a dead drop.
The fundamental goal of intelligence is to obtain knowledge about what is happening in the most important areas of state functioning. In Poland’s case, these are primarily government institutions. Of key importance are the Chancellery of the Prime Minister and people employed at the highest levels of state administration, because they are carriers of strategic information.

At the center of intelligence interest are also the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ministries responsible for the economy, and other state institutions of high operational significance. It is in these areas that people with access to classified data are found, and thus people valuable from the standpoint of foreign services.
There is also an additional aspect of counterintelligence protection: it also applies to people who have already been granted security clearance. During the clearance procedure, counterintelligence officers conduct interviews with candidates, instructing them on how they should respond in specific situations. These people receive contact numbers and email addresses to which they should report any troubling signals—for example, the appearance in their surroundings of a “strange” person attempting to establish unjustified closeness, offering various benefits, or showing excessive, atypical interest.

This also applies to situations in which an attractive woman or a handsome man begins to show a person with access to classified information particular interest—whether insistently or in a more subtle but still disproportionate way. Such signals must reach counterintelligence. This is what counterintelligence protection is about: after receiving a report, an officer initiates appropriate procedures and checks to establish who the person is, whether they are behaving naturally and harmlessly, or whether they may be acting on behalf of a foreign service.
If it turns out that this is someone functioning normally in society, without ties to foreign intelligence services, the case is closed. If not, further operational steps are taken. Counterintelligence protection therefore consists of constant vigilance, responding to threat signals, and safeguarding people who have access to information crucial to the security of the state.

Final decisions regarding access to classified information always belong to counterintelligence. If the analysis shows no threats, the services issue a clear message: “there is no problem, this is a private matter—you may maintain these contacts.” However, there are also opposite situations, when, within the framework of counterintelligence protection, a signal appears that a given person from one’s surroundings requires additional verification or may pose a risk. In such cases, limiting or breaking off contact is recommended until the services clarify the matter.

Important Procedures

There must not be situations in which senior state officials avoid using secure, dedicated classified communication systems. Official correspondence must not be conducted via private email accounts to which unauthorized persons may gain access. Breaking the security of such commercial services is relatively easy, whereas systems for classified communication are much more difficult to compromise. These are the basics of counterintelligence protection.
I also want to emphasize that the use of so-called “sexual spies” is a completely typical working method of intelligence services worldwide. In every country, the operating principles of special services are similar. If an intelligence service considers that such a method may bring results, it will certainly use it
—there is nothing exceptional about this.

At this point, it is worth mentioning again Operation “Beautiful Apollo,” conducted by the GDR intelligence service. The name came from the fact that the main targets were female officials, who were set up with attractive men meant to seduce them. This was only one of many operations—the GDR used numerous methods and even had illegal agent networks placed in the FRG. As a result, GDR services were excellently informed about the situation in the West. And yet—despite such extensive penetration—the GDR ultimately collapsed.