Will the “Istanbul Bridge” Link Us to the Far East?

Poland could become one of the beneficiaries of a gigantic, forward-looking project—but it doesn’t have to. After all, Chinese ships can sail straight from Hamburg to the Mediterranean without calling at the Port of Gdańsk. And who, exactly, would force them to do otherwise?

The container ship Istanbul Bridge reached the British port of Felixstowe on October 13. The voyage took 20 days—just as planned. Next on the schedule was Rotterdam. On October 15 the ship arrived in Hamburg and finally called at Gdańsk. From Gdańsk it headed for the Mediterranean. By comparison, traditional routes—via the Suez Canal or the Cape of Good Hope—take roughly 40 days and 50–60 days, respectively. “This revolutionary shortcut for shipping goods from Asia to Europe is a breakthrough for logistics and international trade,” the media emphasized, noting that the Port of Gdańsk was one of only four European ports included in the test connection. Alongside Gdańsk were Felixstowe, Rotterdam, and Hamburg.

Let us recall that the launch of the China–Europe Arctic Express—symbolically inaugurated by the Istanbul Bridge voyage—is the result
of a broader project (to call it “geopolitical” is merely to give things their proper name) known as the Polar Silk Road. This project could not have moved beyond the drawing board without cooperation from Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Russia borders over half of the Arctic Basin, far exceeding the Arctic coastlines of America and its allies. Without Russia’s consent for Chinese container ships to use its Arctic route—and without its nuclear icebreakers—the entire concept wouldn’t be worth a bowl of rice.

The Global Times, a paper run by China’s ruling Communist Party, wrote—when the Istanbul Bridge departed China’s Port of Ningbo, setting course north toward the Arctic—that in July 2017, during a visit to Russia, President Xi Jinping first proposed the Polar Silk Road concept to the Kremlin. In 2018, China published its “White Paper on China’s Arctic Policy,” formally presenting the idea of jointly developing the Polar Silk Road. With Kremlin approval, Chinese container ships have for several years used Russia’s Arctic route, sailing from China’s eastern ports to Arkhangelsk and St. Petersburg.

The maritime-industry site gCaptain notes that while container shipping via the Arctic is currently limited
to a 4–5-month window, from July
to November, Chinese companies plan
to open year-round routes along the Northern Sea Route by 2030. In cooperation with Russia’s state corporation Rosatom, Chinese operator Newnew Shipping plans to order five Arc7 ice-class container vessels, each with a capacity of 4,400 TEU. “We are currently working on placing orders for the design and construction of Arc7 ice-class container ships with a capacity of 4,400 TEU. We are deciding on a shipyard capable of building them and analyzing various forms of support from the Russian and Chinese authorities,” said Vladimir Panov, Rosatom’s special representative for Arctic development.

The Istanbul Bridge completed the entire route without icebreaker assistance, thanks to the favorable time of year chosen for the voyage. World Nuclear News quotes Panov as saying that both Russians and Chinese have high hopes for making the route year-round: “The Northern Sea Route is developing dynamically, becoming a real and efficient global logistics corridor. This is supported by various factors, including the development of advanced technologies, the construction of a new generation of nuclear icebreakers, and growing interest from international carriers. In addition to our top priority—ensuring navigation safety on the Northern Sea Route—managing speed and travel time on this route has become an important task for us today.”

A day after the ship’s arrival in the UK, Felixstowe hosted the second meeting of the Russian-Chinese subcommission on cooperation along the Northern Sea Route, chaired by Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev. A plan for further work was approved. The Russian representative said: “Our cooperation allows us not only to diversify global trade routes but also
to implement advanced technologies for developing the challenging northern latitudes.” Nuclear-powered icebreakers are a key element of Russia’s plan
to develop the Northern Sea Route. There are plans to expand the route’s network of ports to include St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, and Vladivostok. So much for World Nuclear News.

Li Xiaobin, director of Sealegend, the operator of the Istanbul Bridge, said: “[The Arctic route] significantly accelerates the supply chain, reduces by 40 percent the inventory required of companies shipping their goods, and lowers capital costs for businesses.”

Russian-Chinese cooperation offers clients of services provided by both countries a guarantee that their cargo will reach its destination faster, more safely, and more reliably than if they used other routes and other providers. Two great powers will be standing guard over the interests of the companies sending their goods along the northern corridor. Environmentalists, who have already begun their mantra about a carbon footprint capable of melting glaciers—already dissolving like salt in boiling water—can glue themselves to an ice floe, but even Angela Merkel admitted in a moment of candor who hires environmentalists and for what purposes bankrolls their antics. Namely, those who will now be diligently ensuring that their business flourishes despite Arctic frosts.
All right—but what about us? Do we stand to gain anything? Will Gdańsk become “key,” as our media blare bombastically, in this supply chain from the Far East via the far North?

At the time the Istanbul Bridge set off on her maiden voyage, STU Supply Chain, a major Shenzhen-based freight forwarder in southeastern China, wrote on its website that the “trigger” for the Arctic voyage was Poland, which on September 12 closed its border with Belarus, halting nearly 300 China–Europe Railway Express (CERE) trains and goods worth €25 billion. “This disruption directly hit the Małaszewicze hub—through which 90 percent of Chinese rail freight passes—causing turbulence in trade logistics between China and Europe. The response was the inaugural Arctic Express voyage from China to Europe.”

Did STU’s information have a second meaning? Could it have been a signal to Poland that if it continues to squander its chances so thoughtlessly in the political-economic game, it could be tossed from the board far faster than even the sharpest geopolitical minds—whether in the ruling party or the opposition—might imagine? That while Poland can be one of the beneficiaries of a gigantic, long-horizon project, it certainly doesn’t have to be. In the end, Chinese ships can sail from Hamburg straight to the Mediterranean without calling at Gdańsk. And who, exactly, would force them to do otherwise?